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MERAMEC RIVER KILLING: STATE V. CROCKER AND 
MISSOURI’S FIRST FORAY INTO THE NATIONAL DEBATE ON 
SELF-DEFENSE 
I.  ALONG THE BANKS OF THE MERAMEC 
Main Street in Steelville, Missouri, is home to the Crawford County 
Courthouse of Missouri’s 42nd Judicial Circuit, a two-story brick structure 
whose only architectural flair is some white gabling over a small portico 
emblazoned “In God We Trust,” quotation marks included. Apart from the 
typical courthouse lawn ornamentation of the national and state colors, a five-
foot marble veteran’s memorial, and a matching slab proclaiming the 
building’s identity, the courthouse would be mistaken for a country chapel. 
The octagonal gazebo set off from the front lawn seems almost excessive 
against the modest backdrop of the courthouse. 
One block east of the courthouse, past a few bail bondsmen and lawyers’ 
offices is Main Street’s lone watering hole, the West End Bar and Grill. The 
place is dingy, its lighting supplied almost entirely by sunlight bouncing from 
the street through two front windows, save for some additional blue glow from 
a neon Busch beer sign and a flat screen television. On a usual day, the 
bartender and two or three patrons will sit silently at the bar with their necks 
craned upward at whatever generic crime drama happens to air. Occasionally, 
they will look down to take a drag of a cigarette peeking from an ashtray or 
poke through some cold fries left in the basket that used to contain a 
cheeseburger. Nobody talks. The monotony of the scene is interrupted only by 
random, garbled walkie-talkie exchanges from somewhere beneath the flat 
screen. It is a police scanner. The exchanges between deputy and dispatcher 
are unintelligible under the din of the TV shootout: a minor nuisance. Nobody 
listens. 
These scenes on Main Street are, in a word, typical.
1
 
However, on July 20, 2013, around 1:30 p.m., just six miles from Main 
Street, the scene turned anything but typical.
2
 Forty-eight-year-old Paul Dart 
lay dead on a gravel bar along the Meramec River after a single nine 
 
 1. Although these scenes may seem a bit too typical and, as a result, fabricated for dramatic 
effect, the author has tried to faithfully represent Steelville’s Main Street as he witnessed it in 
October 2013. 
 2. Felony Complaint and Request for Warrant at 2, State v. Crocker, No. 13CF-CR00772 
(Mo. Cir. Ct. July 22, 2013). 
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millimeter round fired by James Crocker struck Dart in the face.
3
 Minutes 
before his death, Dart was paddling down the river in a rented canoe with 
several friends, a summer ritual familiar to most Missourians.
4
 Dart and his 
fellow floaters pulled ashore to grab a few drinks from the cooler and allow 
one of them to urinate.
5
 Unfortunately, the party docked near Crocker’s 
property,
6
 and the intrusion was not welcome.
7
 The unclear demarcation of 
property lines along the river led to an argument between the floaters and 
Crocker as to whether the gravel bar was “public.”
8
 When four members of the 
party began advancing toward him, Crocker removed a pistol from the holster 
on his side, firing two warning shots into the gravel.
9
 Crocker then aimed at the 
man closest to him, the unarmed Dart, and shot him in the face.
10
 Before 
departing the gravel bar, Crocker pointed his gun at another floater and asked, 
“Do you want to be next? I have the power. You don’t.”
11
 The rocks along the 
riverbank were laced with Dart’s blood.
12
 The river continued to flow slowly 
and silently past the calamity. 
This Note categorizes the Paul Dart killing as another episode in a national 
debate over the justification of self-defense. To accomplish this, the Note first 
examines the general history of self-defense law and the associated castle 
doctrine (Part II). It then examines the recent history of Missouri’s current law 
on the “[u]se of force in defense of persons” (Part III).
13
 Next, the Note relates 
Missouri’s own expanded self-defense law to the more widely studied Stand 
Your Ground law of Florida (Part IV).
14
 Finally, the Note critically reviews 
 
 3. Id. 
 4. Sam Levin, Cops: Homeowner Mad at Urinating Man on Meramec Float Trip Shoots, 
Kills Paul Dart, RIVERFRONT TIMES (July 22, 2013, 2:32 PM), http://blogs.riverfronttimes.com/ 
dailyrft/2013/07/meramec_river_float_trip_murder_james_crocker.php. For a sense of its 
familiarity to Missourians, see infra p. 1214. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Crocker’s property line was disputed during trial. See infra pp. 1214–15. 
 7. Felony Complaint and Request for Warrant, supra note 2. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Roche Madden, Wife of Man Gunned Down on Meramec River Speaks Out, FOX2NOW 
ST. LOUIS (July 22, 2013), http://fox2now.com/2013/07/22/wife-of-man-gunned-down-on-float-
trip-speaks-out/. 
 13. MO. REV. STAT. § 563.031 (2014). 
 14. The pathos, intrigue, and historical significance of the Michael Brown killing, unfolding 
just 100 miles northeast of Steelville, exceeded that of the Trayvon Martin killing. However, this 
Note analyzes the Florida killing in depth while largely ignoring (as much as the Saint Louis 
author can bear) the Ferguson killing for the following reasons. First, the Trayvon Martin killing 
morphed the national debate on self-defense—as wedded to issues of class, race, gun ownership, 
and the American propensity for violence—into the form that existed at the time of the Paul Dart 
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Missouri’s expanded self-defense law (Part V) based on the dilemmas caused 
by the inequities in the application of such expanded protections (Subsection 
A), faulty statutory construction (Subsection B), and historical conflicts 
inherent in the justification of self-defense that are exacerbated by the statute 
(Subsection C). The outcome of James Crocker’s trial (Part VI) is related prior 
to the Note’s conclusion (Part VII). This analysis of Missouri’s expanded 
castle doctrine codified in section 563.031 will reveal that the statute and its 
problems are not unique; it is simply another iteration of a counterproductive 
statute founded upon the special interests of gun owners and a 
misconceptualization of American values. 
II.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW JUSTIFICATION OF SELF-DEFENSE 
Fortunately, this shooting on the Meramec River is not as typical for 
Missouri as the afternoon ennui of the West End Bar and Grill, but the shots 
fired by James Crocker are not a minor nuisance or to be dismissed as an 
anomaly. The tragedy, like so many others populating national headlines over 
the past few years,
15
 fits into a larger, historical debate on the tendency of the 
justification of self-defense to promote violence through vigilante action.
16
 
The justification of self-defense exists “to compensate for the limitations 
of a written code . . . [and] to provide an exculpating exception for acts that are 
prohibited by the written code but nonetheless are proper because of justifying 
circumstances not accounted for in it.”
17
 However, like much of American 
criminal law, the current self-defense doctrine “remains grounded in largely 
obsolete nineteenth-century notions of free will and individualism.”
18
 
Historically, self-defense as a justification is seen as “morally appropriate,” 
unlike defenses of excuse, which are simply “not blameworthy.”
19
 
 
killing. Second, the Trayvon Martin killing, like the Paul Dart killing, involved civilian-on-
civilian violence and thus avoids the swirling themes of police militarization and systematic state 
antagonism of minority populations. Third, Ferguson is still playing out through municipal court 
reform, and the already complex event remains difficult to place in historical perspective. 
 15. Lizette Alvarez, Jury Reaches Partial Verdict in Florida Killing over Loud Music, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 16, 2014, at A20; Lizette Alvarez & Cara Buckley, Zimmerman Is Acquitted in 
Trayvon Martin Killing, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2013, at A1; Monica Davey, Shooting of Black 
Woman Stirs Racial Tensions Around Detroit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2013, at A11. 
 16. The vigilante actions in all of these cases have been particularly troubling because all the 
defendants are white and all the victims are black. Alvarez, supra note 15. 
 17. Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm as a Prerequisite for 
Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. REV. 266, 272 (1975). 
 18. Garrett Epps, Any Which Way but Loose: Interpretive Strategies and Attitudes Toward 
Violence in the Evolution of the Anglo-American “Retreat Rule,” 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
303, 328 (1992). 
 19. Id. at 305–06 (quoting Kent Greenawalt, Distinguishing Justifications from Excuses, 49 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 91 (1986)). 
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At common law, a defender is justified in using force to repel an attack 
within certain limitations. The defender must reasonably believe that force is 
immediately necessary to repel a threat, and the force used must be 
proportional to the threat posed.
20
 In addition, a defender is not justified in 
using force to repel an attack if he or she may safely retreat from that attack.
21
 
This final limitation became known as the “Retreat Rule.”
22
 However, the 
common law maxim that a man’s home is his castle also gave rise to an 
exception to this duty to retreat, embracing the notion “that retreating to the 
home was, essentially, retreating to the wall.”
23
 Whether through application of 
the castle doctrine or some other mechanism, American jurisdictions began 
carving out “no retreat” exceptions to the common law rule as early as the 
nineteenth century.
24
 However, under the castle doctrine, all other self-defense 
requirements involving the reasonableness and proportionality of the use of 
force remained in effect.
25
 Proportionality is founded on the rationale that it 
“protect[s] the legal order” and is applied in a number of international 
jurisdictions.
26
 
Many states began eliminating these common law requirements, such as 
the duty to retreat, from the justification of self-defense through legislative 
action in the mid-2000s.
27
 By 2013, a majority of jurisdictions in the United 
States had adopted “Shoot First” statutes, permitting the use of deadly force in 
public places where there previously was a duty to retreat at common law.
28
 
III.  MISSOURI’S DIVERGENCE FROM THE COMMON LAW 
One statute
29
 that is more permissive of the use of deadly force than the 
common law doctrine of self-defense is Missouri’s expanded castle doctrine 
 
 20. 2 WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 127 (15th ed. 2014). 
 21. See id. 
 22. Epps, supra note 18, at 305. 
 23. Sarah A. Pohlman, Comment, Shooting from the Hip: Missouri’s New Approach to 
Defense of Habitation, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 857, 860 (2012). 
 24. Epps, supra note 18, at 307. 
 25. Pohlman, supra note 23. 
 26. Mordechai Kremnitzer & Khalid Ghanayim, Proportionality and the Aggressor’s 
Culpability in Self-Defense, 39 TULSA L. REV. 875, 893 (2004). 
 27. P. Luevonda Ross, The Transmogrification of Self-Defense by National Rifle 
Association-Inspired Statutes: From the Doctrine of Retreat to the Right to Stand Your Ground, 
35 S.U. L. REV. 1, 16–18 (2007). 
 28. “Stand Your Ground” Policy Summary, LAW CENTER TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE 
(July 18, 2013), http://smartgunlaws.org/shoot-first-laws-policy-summary/. 
 29. And, it appears that there are other statutes poised to join it. See Marie French, Missouri 
House Approves Extension of ‘Castle Doctrine’ to Guests, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Apr. 24, 
2014, 2:15 PM), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/missouri-house-approves-
extension-of-castle-doctrine-to-guests/article_b5c62eb8-9443-5bf5-a0cd-ec2ebd8eaef6.html. Of 
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found in Missouri Revised Statute section 563.031.
30
 That section eliminates 
any duty to retreat from private property owned by the defender and allows the 
use of deadly force on private property owned by the defender in situations 
where only non-deadly force would be permitted otherwise.
31
 Although that 
self-defense statute qualifies as an expanded castle doctrine—broadening the 
application of the doctrine from the dwelling to any real property owned by the 
defender
32
—the spirit of the law resembles the Stand Your Ground laws that 
became the center of debate in the wake of the Trayvon Martin shooting.
33
 
Further, both Missouri and Florida’s self-defense statutes implicate the even 
more polarizing issue regarding the right to possess and use firearms.
34
 
Missouri case law largely followed the common law justification of self-
defense throughout the twentieth century.
35
 In the 1980 decision of State v. 
Ivicsics, the Eastern District Court of Appeals held that defense of habitation 
was merely an “accelerated” form of self-defense.
36
 The court set forth the 
following test for the use of deadly force in defense of habitation: 
The defense of habitation grants the lawful occupant of a dwelling the 
privilege to use deadly force to prevent an attempted unlawful entry into the 
dwelling, if the occupant had reasonable cause to believe that (1) there is 
immediate danger the entry will occur, (2) the entry is being attempted for the 
purpose of killing or inflicting serious bodily harm on the occupant and (3) 
deadly force is necessary to prevent the unlawful entry.
37
 
The privilege to use deadly force was, therefore, accelerated because the 
deadly force could be used to repel an attacker’s unlawful entry to the 
defender’s home prior to the anticipated attack. However, this brand of defense 
of premises was not much of a departure from established self-defense 
doctrine, because the defender would still be required to show a reasonable 
belief that the entry was intended for the purpose of killing or inflicting serious 
 
course, statutes like Missouri Revised Statute section 563.046 (permitting law enforcement use of 
deadly force to effect the arrest of a felon) have been in the books for some time. See John Simon, 
Tennessee v. Garner: The Fleeing Felon Rule, 30 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 1259, 1266 n.46 (1986). 
 30. Pohlman, supra note 23, at 857. 
 31. Id. at 858. 
 32. Id. at 857–58. 
 33. Tamara F. Lawson, A Fresh Cut in an Old Wound—A Critical Analysis of the Trayvon 
Martin Killing: The Public Outcry, the Prosecutors’ Discretion, and the Stand Your Ground Law, 
23 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 271, 272 (2012). 
 34. The Speaker Pro Tem made this implication unavoidable when, in his September 12, 
2007, address to the Missouri House of Representatives, he exclaimed, “We passed the conceal 
and carry bill and the castle doctrine—We respect Missourians’ gun rights!” H. JOURNAL, 94th 
Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess., at 5 (2007). 
 35. Pohlman, supra note 23, at 869. 
 36. State v. Ivicsics, 604 S.W.2d 773, 777 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). 
 37. Id. 
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bodily harm.
38
 The defender’s presence in his or her dwelling did not 
fundamentally alter the nature of the justification of self-defense.
39
 
The fundamental change occurred with the state legislature’s 2007 and 
2010 amendments to the Revised Missouri Statutes’ section 563.031.
40
 In 
2007, “defense of habitation and self-defense officially merged into one 
statute . . . [creating] a new defense of habitation provision within the pre-
existing self-defense statute.”
41
 The pertinent parts of the statute read: 
1. A person may, subject to the provisions of subsection 2 of this section, use 
physical force upon another person when and to the extent he or she 
reasonably believes such force to be necessary to defend himself or herself or a 
third person from what he or she reasonably believes to be the use or imminent 
use of unlawful force by such other person, unless: 
(1) The actor was the initial aggressor . . . . 
2. A person may not use deadly force upon another person under the 
circumstances specified in subsection 1 of this section unless: 
(1) He or she reasonably believes that such deadly force is necessary to protect 
himself or herself or another against death, serious physical injury, or any 
forcible felony; or 
(2) Such force is used against a person who unlawfully enters, remains after 
unlawfully entering, or attempts to unlawfully enter a dwelling, residence, or 
vehicle lawfully occupied by such person. 
3. A person does not have a duty to retreat from a dwelling, residence, or 
vehicle where the person is not unlawfully entering or unlawfully remaining.
42
 
The 2007 amendment effectively extended the privilege to use deadly 
force not only in situations involving unlawful entry for the purpose of causing 
serious bodily harm, but also in situations where that unlawful entry has 
already been completed.
43
 This amendment specifically responded to the 2006 
decision in State v. Goodine,
44
 where the court held that “once the intruder 
enters the premises without resistance, the defender is no longer entitled to an 
instruction on defense of premises.”
45
 With the 2007 amendment, the 
legislature specifically allowed the justification of defense of premises for the 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Pohlman, supra note 23, at 869–70. 
 40. Id. at 871, 879. 
 41. Id. at 875. 
 42. MO. REV. STAT. § 563.031 (2007) (emphasis added). 
 43. Pohlman, supra note 23, at 875–76. 
 44. 196 S.W.3d 607 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006); Robert H. Dierker, Defense of Premises—“Castle 
Doctrine,” 32 MO. PRAC., MO. CRIM. LAW § 9.4 n.12 (2d ed.). 
 45. Goodine, 196 S.W.3d at 613. 
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use of deadly force.
46
 But, the legislature quietly went a step further in 
expanding the justifiable use of deadly force by effectively removing the 
proportionality requirement from the defense of premises.
47
 “Now . . . simple 
unlawful force will justify a response of deadly force if the person using 
unlawful force is also trespassing.”
48
 
The legislature did not stop with the 2007 amendment. The 2010 
amendment to section 563.031 again extended the justifiable use of deadly 
force under defense of premises by broadening the definition of premises and 
explicitly eliminating the duty to retreat from any premises owned by the 
defender.
49
 The statute now includes the following: 
2. A person may not use deadly force upon another person under the 
circumstances specified in subsection 1 of this section unless: . . . 
(3) Such force is used against a person who unlawfully enters, remains after 
unlawfully entering, or attempts to unlawfully enter private property that is 
owned or leased by an individual claiming a justification of using protective 
force under this section. 
3. A person does not have a duty to retreat from a dwelling, residence, or 
vehicle where the person is not unlawfully entering or unlawfully remaining. A 
person does not have a duty to retreat from private property that is owned or 
leased by such individual.
50
 
Just to make the expansion of the justifiable use of deadly force abundantly 
clear, the legislature provided the following definition in 563.011: “(6) ‘Private 
property’, any real property in this state that is privately owned or leased.”
51
 
Now, defense of habitation is extended all the way to a homeowner’s property 
line despite the courts’ previous refusal to extend defense of habitation beyond 
even the curtilage of a home.
52
 
IV.  MISSOURI’S EXPANDED CASTLE DOCTRINE IN RELATION TO STAND YOUR 
GROUND 
The elimination of the duty to retreat from as broad of an area as “any real 
property”
53
 resembles the general elimination of the duty to retreat in other 
 
 46. § 563.031(2). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Pohlman, supra note 23, at 879. 
 49. MO. REV. STAT. § 563.031 (2010). 
 50. Id. 
 51. § 563.011(6). 
 52. Pohlman, supra note 23, at 879. 
 53. § 563.011(6). 
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states’ Stand Your Ground laws.
54
 On October 26, 2005, Florida enacted the 
infamous Stand Your Ground law that “radically expanded Florida’s self-
defense law, even insulating shooters from criminal prosecution and civil 
suit.”
55
 Before that law, a defender was required to show a reasonable belief 
that the use of force was “necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily 
harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the imminent commission of 
a forcible felony.”
56
 He or she had a duty to retreat if he could do so in 
absolute safety.
57 
Stand Your Ground removed that duty, allowing defenders to 
“stand their ground and meet force with force.”
58
 
Under Florida’s Stand Your Ground law, self-defense is no longer an 
affirmative defense that can only be adjudicated at trial.
59
 Stand Your Ground 
shifts the burden to the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
defender was not acting in self-defense and creates a presumption that a person 
possessed a reasonable fear of “imminent peril of death or great bodily harm” 
if “[t]he person against whom . . . force was used was in the process of 
unlawfully and forcefully entering, [or had already entered], a ‘dwelling, 
residence, or occupied vehicle.’”
60
 Defenders also have the right to a pre-trial 
hearing where, if the preponderance of the evidence shows that they acted 
lawfully pursuant to Stand Your Ground, they can be immunized from future 
prosecution or civil suit.
61
 The increased privilege to use deadly force to repel 
an unlawful entry or completed entry of a “dwelling, residence, or occupied 
vehicle” is obvious in both Florida’s and Missouri’s statutes.
62
 
Although George Zimmerman raised only a traditional self-defense claim 
in his trial for shooting and killing Trayvon Martin, the case begged the 
question: “Are Floridians too quick to use deadly force?”
63
 Public outcry also 
implicitly questioned whether that state’s Stand Your Ground law was 
“appropriate and adequate to keep Floridians safe from future tragedies.”
64
 
Zimmerman claimed not to be familiar with the Stand Your Ground law during 
 
 54. Tamara Rice Lave, Shoot to Kill: A Critical Look at Stand Your Ground Laws, 67 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 827, 832–33 (2013). 
 55. Id. at 832. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 832–33. 
 59. Lave, supra note 54, at 834–35. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 835. 
 62. Compare id. at 834–35 and MO. REV. STAT. § 563.031 (2010). 
 63. Lawson, supra note 33, at 299. 
 64. Id. Because Stand Your Ground laws grant individuals expansive privileges to use 
handguns against others when they perceive a threat, these laws levy “a high cost, as sometimes 
the gun owner is wrong in his or her assessment of the existence of a threat and/or its seriousness, 
and a victim’s life is lost needlessly.” Id. at 300. 
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his trial, but the law was brought to the jury’s attention nonetheless when a 
former professor testified that Zimmerman had “actually been taught about the 
law before the shooting took place.”
65
 This leads to speculation that 
Zimmerman either lied or, even if not consciously familiar with the law, 
somehow internalized that knowledge, which incentivized his decision to 
follow Martin despite the 911 dispatcher’s admonition not to do so.
66
 Whether 
or not the Stand Your Ground law directly resulted in the violence that claimed 
Martin’s life, Zimmerman’s highly publicized acquittal certainly sends a 
message to prospective vigilantes across the country that such violence is 
justified.
67
 
A similar dilemma arose in the 2013 killing of Paul Dart. There is no way 
to know if James Crocker was truly aware of the applicability of Missouri’s 
expanded castle doctrine or if that awareness encouraged his decision to shoot 
Dart. However, Crocker’s reported statements that “it’s my property, and I was 
going to protect it” and “I have the power”
68
 seem to beg the same questions 
that arose from the Trayvon Martin killing: Are Americans too quick to use 
deadly force?
69
 Is Missouri’s expanded castle doctrine appropriate and 
adequate to keep Missourians safe from future tragedies? 
However, unlike the Trayvon Martin trial that only obliquely referred to 
the Stand Your Ground law,
70
 the Missouri’s expanded castle doctrine became 
an important issue in the trial of James Crocker.
71
 If the gravel bar where Paul 
Dart died was on Crocker’s property, defense of premises would apply where it 
would not have prior to 2010.
72
 The use of force in the defense of premises 
would not have been available to Crocker to defend against an intrusion onto 
his real property until the amendments to 563.031.
73
 If the legislature had not 
pre-empted State v. Goodine, use of force in defense of premises would not 
 
 65. Lave, supra note 54, at 853. 
 66. Id. at 853–54. 
 67. If the reader doubts that this message could be taken away from the Florida tragedy, 
recall Zimmerman’s fandom that gifted him a fortune for his artwork. Vivian Kuo, Bids for 
George Zimmerman Artwork Top $100,000, CNN.COM (Dec. 18, 2013, 10:13 A.M.), 
http://www.cnn. com/2013/12/17/us/george-zimmerman-ebay-painting. 
 68. Felony Complaint and Request for Warrant, supra note 2. 
 69. This is certainly a valid question, considering that homicides rates were as much as 
seven times that of other industrialized nations from 1950 to 2000. Gary LaFree & Andromachi 
Tseloni, Democracy and Crime: A Multilevel Analysis of Homicide Trends in Forty-Four 
Countries, 1950-2000, 605 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 26, 34–35 (2006). 
 70. Cara Buckley, Zimmerman Studied ‘Stand Your Ground’ in Class, Florida Court Is Told, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2013, at A15. 
 71. More accurately, it became an issue important for the state to avoid. See infra pp. 1216–
17. 
 72. See Pohlman, supra note 23, at 879. 
 73. Id. 
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have been available to Crocker because any unlawful entry to his real property 
would have been completed.
74
 The 2007 amendment to section 563.031, 
further eliminating the proportionality requirement in situations of unlawful 
entry of premises owned by the defender,
75
 also would allow Crocker to argue 
that his use of deadly force was justified based on his reasonable belief that the 
intruding floaters intended to use any amount of force against him.
76
 
According to Crocker’s statements to investigators, “four male subjects . . . 
began advancing toward him, [and] one of the males had two rocks in his 
hands.”
77
 In interviews provided by Dart’s wife, there is some suggestion that 
Dart grabbed for Crocker’s gun: “He went to the guy’s arm to try to stop 
him.”
78
 Crocker could argue that all of these factors substantiate his fear of an 
attack and that such an attack justifies his use of deadly force under section 
563.031. On the other hand, Crocker could invoke the general justification of 
self-defense, but there would be no reason not to pursue a defense under 
section 563.031 given its elimination of the common law proportionality 
requirement.
79
 
Although reports in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch and Riverfront Times 
never delved into editorialism, the tenor of the coverage is that the Dart killing 
was a senseless act by a crazed property-owner taking some backwards sense 
of justice to a horrifying extreme.
80
 The vacant stare and unkempt hair of 
Crocker’s mugshot that accompanies every article do little to paint Crocker as 
a sympathetic character.
81
 But, just as every hour of the Trayvon Martin trial 
exposed the prosecution’s case as increasingly thin—and talk show pundits 
slowly began uttering the word “acquittal” without any real exasperation
82
—
 
 74. State v. Goodine, 196 S.W.3d 607, 613 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006). 
 75. Pohlman, supra note 23, at 878–79. 
 76. See MO. REV. STAT. § 563.011 (2010). 
 77. Felony Complaint and Request for Warrant, supra note 2. 
 78. Kim Bell, Meramec Float Trip Ends in Fatal Shooting After Dispute over Property 
Rights Along Waterway, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (July 23, 2013), http://www.stltoday.com/ 
news/local/crime-and-courts/meramec-float-trip-ends-in-fatal-shooting-after-dispute-over/article_ 
a2774d0e-578c-5d01-89e2-d334dbe7c9c3.html. 
 79. Pohlman, supra note 23, at 879. 
 80. See Bell, supra note 78; Sam Levin, James Crocker: Evidence Shows Float Trip Shooter 
Was Attacked, Injured, Says Lawyer, RIVERFRONT TIMES BLOG (Aug. 27, 2013, 7:00 AM), 
http://blogs.riverfronttimes.com/dailyrft/2013/08/james_crocker_paul_dart_float_trip_shooting_ 
trial.php. 
 81. See Bell, supra note 78; Levin, supra note 80. 
 82. Erin Donaghue, George Zimmerman Verdict: Prosecutors “Didn’t Have the Evidence” 
to Prove Their Case, Experts Say, CBSNEWS.COM (July 15, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.cbs 
news.com/news/george-zimmerman-verdict-prosecutors-didnt-have-the-evidence-to-prove-their-
case-experts-say/. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2015] MERAMEC RIVER KILLING 1207 
 
the real monster in the Dart killing could be made not of the shooter, but the 
law that emboldened him. 
Of course, the Dart killing also lacks the racially charged storyline that 
may have ultimately doomed the story to merely regional significance.
83
 
However, this absent element makes the Dart killing more about the failings of 
the law rather than the prejudices of the actors involved. The protections of the 
expanded castle doctrine, which can obviously only apply to owners or lessees, 
raise the same issues of class discrimination that have been suggested in the 
Stand Your Ground debate.
84
 In Missouri, two propositions should be 
considered: (1) the extent of one’s privilege to use deadly force is directly 
related to the amount of real property that person owns or leases; (2) deadly 
force used in defense of premises is most likely to be used on those who own 
or lease smaller properties. This second proposition is especially true in the 
context of the float trip, in which Dart was participating at the time of his 
death. Although Dart was forty-eight years old, floaters are usually younger 
people who, as a result, lease smaller real property.
85
 Further, floaters are most 
likely to come into contact with property owners asserting their expanded right 
to defense of premises because floaters make use of public waterways cutting 
directly through, or adjacent to, private property.
86
 Thus, in addition to the two 
primary questions posed above,
87
 a third question is added to the debate: 
Whose interests motivate Missouri’s lawmakers? 
V.  A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF SECTION 563.031 
A. Partisan Legislation Catering to Special Interests 
With this discussion of who ultimately benefits from the expanded castle 
doctrine, it is helpful to understand how the bills were pushed through the 
legislative process. Stand Your Ground laws were first conceived in a “flurry 
of national legislative activity” in 2005, a time when violent crime was, 
nationally, on the decline.
88
 That activity was backed primarily by the National 
 
 83. Dart was a forty-eight-year-old white male, and Crocker is a fifty-nine-year-old white 
male. See Bell, supra note 78. 
 84. Lave, supra note 54, at 850–51. 
 85. This is an observation based on the author’s repeated participation in float trips from 
2003 to 2014. 
 86. See Elder v. Delcour, 269 S.W.2d 17, 20, 26 (Mo. 1954) (recognizing a public easement 
allowing the use of canoes on the Meramec River even though the waterway was considered non-
navigable). 
 87. Are Americans too quick to use deadly force? Is Missouri’s expanded castle doctrine 
appropriate and adequate to keep Missourians safe from future tragedies? See supra pp. 1205. 
 88. Ross, supra note 27, at 16–17. 
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Rifle Association (NRA).
89
 Likewise, Missouri’s subsequent amendments 
enjoyed the full support of the NRA, with the organization’s executive director 
Chris Cox joining Governor Matt Blunt for the signing of Senate Bill 62 (the 
2007 amendment).
90
 Cox made no attempt to veil the significance of the 
amendment to the NRA’s grand agenda of expanding gun rights: “Missourians 
are fortunate to have a Governor and state legislators who respect and cherish 
their Second Amendment rights.”
91
 
With bills like S.B. 62, it is no wonder that the legislative process is often 
cynically compared to sausage-making. The only thing wrong with the 
sausage-making analogy in the case of section 563.031 is that nothing 
palatable was produced by the grotesquery of the legislative process. While 
Second Amendment proponents painted Stand Your Ground or castle doctrine 
legislation as safeguarding fundamental rights, critics immediately warned 
against a disproportionate, negative impact on racial minorities: “These laws 
are passed to protect the law-abiding people from criminals, . . . [y]et innocent 
people may end up being killed because of the new laws, while nothing will 
happen to the killers.”
92
 These fears, unfortunately, seem to have been 
vindicated by the actions of George Zimmerman, Theodore Wafer, and 
Michael Dunn.
93
 
Again, on the surface, the racial component is lacking from the Dart 
killing—the violence was not cross-racial.
94
 However, the treatment of the 
shooting by law enforcement and the media may point to a dormant form of 
racial discrimination. The media readily dismissed Crocker as a gun-toting 
psychopath. One dismissive report proclaimed, “James Crocker Cannot Claim 
‘Castle Doctrine’ in Shooting Along Meramec River, Says Sheriff,” only days 
after the shooting.
95
 This revelation seems to be based primarily on Sheriff 
Randy Martin’s statement that “[w]e don’t know where the property owners 
[sic] land begins and ends,” as Sheriff Martin is never quoted to confirm 
explicitly that the castle doctrine does not apply.
96
 Essentially, the report 
dismisses Crocker’s defense on the conjecture that the shooting occurred 
 
 89. Id. at 17. 
 90. Missouri Governor Signs Castle Doctrine, Hunting Preservation Bills into Law, NAT’L 
RIFLE ASS’N-INST. FOR LEGIS. ACTION (July 6, 2007), http://www.nraila.org/hunting/issues-and-
alerts/2007/missouri-governor-signs-castle-doctrine.aspx?s=missouri+governor+signs&st=&ps=. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Ross, supra note 27, at 45. 
 93. See supra text accompanying note 14. 
 94. See Bell, supra note 78. 
 95. Farrah Fazal, James Crocker Cannot Claim ‘Castle Doctrine’ in Shooting Along 
Meramec River, Says Sheriff, KSDK.COM (July 22, 2013), http://www.ksdk.com/news/article/38 
9366/3/Sheriff-Castle-Law-does-not-apply-in-shooting-along-Meramec-River. 
 96. Id. 
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beyond his property line. This creates a new dilemma: Would this particular 
report afford Crocker the protection of the castle doctrine if the shooting victim 
had been black? Or even more troubling: Can the justice system (through 
prosecutorial discretion or juror bias) choose when to apply the castle doctrine 
based upon the victim’s identity? A guilty verdict in Crocker’s trial, juxtaposed 
with the outcomes of the Zimmerman and Dunn cases,
97
 may suggest that 
Crocker’s jurors, as proxy for the white majority of Americans, can accept the 
occasional loss of life resulting from the expanded castle doctrine, as long as 
that life is not of the same color as them. 
B. The Problematic Construction of Section 563.031 
Sheriff Martin’s comment about the unclear demarcation of Crocker’s 
property line raises another issue with, specifically, the 2010 amendment to 
section 563.031: Does the applicability of the statute now depend on 
something as esoteric to the layperson as riparian rights based upon the 
navigability of a watercourse? If so, does the statute attempt to provide 
uniformity in a place better suited for case-by-case determinations? 
Conceptually, the 2010 amendment makes little sense. If Crocker is not 
entitled to the protection of the castle doctrine on the gravel bar where he shot 
Dart, would he receive the protection fifteen feet farther into the woods? What 
about fifty feet? Attributing varying levels of sanctity for any given outdoor 
location, based upon the content of a legal title, is simply too far afield from 
the philosophical underpinnings of the common law castle doctrine.
98
 The 
legislature likely had visions of a Goodine-style front yard melee when it 
extended the castle doctrine,
99
 but extending the doctrine to any real property is 
unreasonably broad—especially when any sanctity of the front yard could have 
been protected by using a word like curtilage.
100
 Again, Missouri’s castle 
doctrine has become so expansive that it is conceptually closer to a general 
Stand Your Ground statute. When viewed in this context, it is no wonder that 
the NRA considered the passage of the section 563.031 amendments such a 
momentous victory for Second Amendment rights.
101
 
Another indicator that the statute was ill-conceived is simply its 
manufactured necessity. By conflating defense of premises (found in 
 
 97. Zimmerman was acquitted, and the Dunn jury failed to reach a verdict on the second-
degree murder count. Alvarez, supra note 15; Alvarez & Buckley, supra note 15. 
 98. Pohlman, supra note 23. 
 99. State v. Goodine, 196 S.W.3d 607, 610–11 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006). 
 100. Pohlman, supra note 23, at 879. 
 101. Missouri Governor Signs Important Pro-Gun Measures into Law, NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N-
INST. FOR LEGIS. ACTION (July 14, 2010), http://www.nraila.org/legislation/state-legislation/ 
2010/7/missouri-governor-signs-important-pro-g.aspx?s=pro-gun%%2020measures&st=%20104 
89&ps=. 
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subsection 2) and a now absurdly expanded castle doctrine (found in 
subsection 3), the statute has displaced an established line of cases that kept the 
two doctrines independent, both with clear, well-reasoned limits on their 
application.
102
 As mentioned earlier, cases like Goodine may have limited the 
application of defense of habitation,
103
 but the legislature’s response was just 
as disproportionate as a nine-millimeter round answering a thrown rock. 
Aside from the fatal consequences of the amendments, Sarah Pohlman 
lucidly criticized the newly convoluted language of section 563.031 in her 
article Shooting from the Hip: Missouri’s New Approach to Defense of 
Habitation.
104
 Pohlman pointed out that it could at least be argued that the 
added subsection 2, which states: 
A person may not use deadly force upon another person under the 
circumstances specified in subsection 1 of this section unless . . . [s]uch force 
is used against a person who unlawfully enters, remains after unlawfully 
entering, or attempts to unlawfully enter private property that is owned or 
leased by an individual claiming a justification of using protective force under 
this section[,]
105
 
did not “incorporate subsection 1’s requirements of reasonable belief, 
necessity, and imminent harm.”
106
 Although Pohlman ultimately believed the 
alternative interpretation of the statute, that subsection 2 did indeed incorporate 
the requirement of subsection 1,
107
 the statutory language was unnecessarily 
muddled and then substituted for clear case law.
108
 This was a second 
indication that the amendments were ramrodded through the legislature, 
without meaningful reflection, at the behest of the NRA.
109
 
Even with subsection 2’s incorporation of subsection 1, Missouri courts 
are left to sort out what is now “an extreme divergence from the 
proportionality element” that existed prior to the amendments.
110
 With the 
 
 102. Pohlman, supra note 23, at 869–70. 
 103. Goodine, 196 S.W.3d at 613. 
 104. Pohlman, supra note 23, at 881–82. 
 105. MO. REV. STAT. § 563.031.2 (2010). 
 106. Pohlman, supra note 23, at 877. 
 107. Id. at 877–78. 
 108. The Western District Court of Appeals agreed and disagreed with Pohlman in State v. 
Clinch, 335 S.W.3d 579, 587–88 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011). In dicta, the court noted that while 
subsection 2 did not “eliminate the requirement of [imminence found in subsection 1, it] . . . 
codified that the unlawful entry into a dwelling, residence, or vehicle constitutes the act of force 
necessary to justify deadly force.” Id. at 588. Thus, in defense of premises cases, the imminence 
requirement of subsection 1 is so fundamentally altered that subsection 1 is not really 
incorporated by subsection 2 at all. 
 109. See Missouri Governor Signs Important Pro-Gun Measures into Law, supra note 101. 
 110. Pohlman, supra note 23, at 878. 
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amendments, if a defender anticipates any use of unlawful force, a response of 
deadly force is justified if the attacker is also trespassing.
111
 If section 563.031 
was put to the jury in the Crocker case, Crocker’s defense would have 
depended on evidence that the floaters were approaching him with rocks. Did 
the legislature seriously contemplate that a bullet would be an appropriate 
response to a rock? The problem with any expanded self-defense statute and 
concomitant reaffirmation of Second Amendment rights is that proportionality 
becomes increasingly harder to find when the destructive power of firearms 
enters the picture.
112
 Proportionality is essential to self-defense’s existence as a 
justification and to its role in protecting the populace.
113
 Thus, the legislature 
should seriously consider whether the fundamental social goals of self-defense 
could be achieved when legislation expanding the doctrine is wedded to the 
proliferation of gun ownership.
114
 
C. Historical Conflicts Inherent in the Justification of Self-Defense 
The reality is that the conflicts resulting from Missouri’s expanded castle 
doctrine are simply the latest iterations of tensions that have always existed in 
self-defense law. While the tension in the Dart killing was above characterized 
as floaters versus landowners, that tension can be further reduced, at the risk of 
oversimplification, to urban versus rural ideologies.
115
 Those competing 
ideologies underscore an even greater identity crisis at the core of American 
politics. In fact, the first principal question posed above—are Americans too 
quick to use deadly force?—is simply a sub-question of a broader question of 
American identity: Who are we and what kind of country do we want to make 
for ourselves? 
On the side of more restrictive self-defense justification are urbanites, who 
are generally “egalitarian . . . solidaristic . . . [and] ‘logically opposed to 
individualism.’”
116
 “Urban individuals see gun possession as a threat to their 
sense of community.”
117
 Naturally, self-defense, with an emphasis on self, 
champions the ideal of individualism.
118
 The logical link between self-defense 
 
 111. Id. at 879. 
 112. The percentage of homicides resulting from firearm use hovered around 70% for most of 
the twentieth century. See Lance K. Stell, The Production of Criminal Violence in America: Is 
Strict Gun Control the Solution?, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 38, 40 (2004). 
 113. Kremnitzer & Ghanayim, supra note 26. 
 114. H. JOURNAL, 94th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess., at 7 (Mo. 2007). 
 115. Christopher T. Pierce, Not Only in My Backyard but on My Front Stoop: The Forgotten 
Opinion of Urbanites About Concealed-Carry in Missouri, 21 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 407, 414–
25 (2006). 
 116. Id. at 421. 
 117. Id. at 422. 
 118. Epps, supra note 18. 
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and this rural sense of individualism is all too apparent in expansions of self-
defense law. Rural individuals are more likely to live in areas isolated from 
law enforcement, and self-help may present the only option available for 
preservation of life or property. Fittingly, the expanded castle doctrine was 
born of this rural milieu; Senate Bill 62 was sponsored by a state senator from 
Mount Vernon, Missouri.
119
 
In a sense, Missouri is the perfect powder keg for urban-rural conflict 
because it possesses two major urban centers (Kansas City and Saint Louis) 
that bracket over one hundred largely rural counties (perhaps with the 
exception of Boone County, which possesses the University of Missouri-
Columbia). The ideological divide is clearly depicted in the 2012 general 
election results—presidential candidate Barack Obama emerged victorious in 
only four counties but won a whopping 82.7% of the vote in Saint Louis 
City.
120
 In 2014, the state has a Democratic governor but a House of 
Representatives controlled by Republicans.
121
 The demographic dichotomy 
existing in Missouri further complicates the second principal question posed 
above—Is Missouri’s expanded castle doctrine appropriate and adequate to 
keep Missourians safe from future tragedies?—because it could lead to the 
unsatisfying answer of some Missourians, but not others. In response to this 
equivocation, we could allow the legislative process to keep churning out 
artificial codifications of whatever behaviors are ostensibly deemed acceptable 
by the majority of the population.
122
 The other option is to grapple with our 
identity crisis so that we can definitively answer whether expanded self-
defense statutes really help fashion the world we want for ourselves.
123
 
 
 119. Missouri Governor Traveling the State and Signing Important Pro-Gun Legislation!, 
NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N-INST. FOR LEGIS. ACTION (July 2, 2007), https://www.nraila.org/articles/200 
70702/missouri-governor-traveling-the-state-a. 
 120. 2012 Missouri Presidential Results, POLITICO.COM (Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.politi 
co.com/2012-election/results/president/missouri/. 
 121. State of Missouri—General Election—November 6, 2012 Official Results, MO. 
SECRETARY ST.—ELECTIONS & VOTING (Dec. 5, 2012), http://enr.sos.mo.gov/enrnet/default. 
aspx?eid=750002497. 
 122. But see Sanford Levinson, “Who Counts?” “Sez Who?”, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 937, 947–
58 (2014) (scrutinizing whether our system of geographic representation really expresses the will 
of the people). 
 123. It is important to remember the role of conflicting urban and rural sensibilities even in 
Saint Louis’s current decidedly urban morass. That conflict is not the defining factor of the 
culture of violence gripping American cities, however, because there is no one defining factor. To 
reduce the events following the death of Michael Brown to any one issue (police militarization, 
structural racism, or even misguided self-defense legislation) neglects the complexity of the world 
that we already have fashioned for ourselves, which involved many missteps over many years. 
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VI.  THE REALITY OF TRIAL 
On May 12, 2014, James Crocker’s trial commences at the Crawford 
County Courthouse. Seemingly every sheriff’s deputy in the county finds a 
post to man at the chapel-courthouse. At 8:30 a.m., three deputies guard the 
front door to vet the lone observer.
124
 The clerk’s office has blocked cause 
number 13CF-CR00772 on Case.net—Missouri’s online case information 
system—and the court’s administrative assistant refuses to provide any 
information regarding the trial schedule over the telephone. The tensions 
between the victim’s family and defendant’s supporters are less of a reason and 
more of an excuse for the heightened security. The rumored presence of one 
cub reporter from the St. Louis Post-Dispatch is enough temptation for the men 
and women in beige to flex.
125
 The courtroom is typical as far as the climate 
and primary building material are concerned: nearly freezing and lacquered 
wood. However, the benches in the gallery, constructed from wrought iron and 
wood slats, look more suited to the gazebo outside. The bar is similarly 
constructed from fence-like wrought iron. The bench, tucked into the corner 
opposite the doorway, is only a foot or two raised from the well. Behind that, a 
dry wall partition separates the courtroom from the judge’s chambers but does 
little to soundproof the conversations that occur in camera. 
The voir dire process is scheduled to begin around 9:00 a.m., but the 
prosecutor and the court are still resolving pretrial motions. Crocker sits alone 
at the defendant’s table, blankly staring forward with his hands clasped in front 
of him. His face, still goateed, is even more drawn than the mugshots that 
surfaced nearly a year earlier. Everything about Crocker is drab: his blue jeans 
(concealing leg braces), slate collared shirt (tucked in but with no tie), and gray 
mane (combed back tightly before curling just below his shoulders). The 
Honorable Kelly Parker sits at the bench, unrobed for the pretrial motions but 
dressed sharply. The angles of his suit match his cropped hair and rectangular 
frames of his glasses. His rulings are deliberately paced with a slight country 
 
 124. The lone observer is the author because Judge Kelly Parker prohibited the media from 
attending voir dire. 
 125. As it turns out, Jesse Bogan’s coverage of the trial is fantastic. Listed chronologically: 
Jesse Bogan, Trial Set to Begin in Meramec Float Trip Killing, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (May 
13, 2014), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/trial-set-to-begin-in-meramec-
float-trip-killing/article_e400b956-45fe-522b-828d-02457b22f49b.html; Jesse Bogan, Lawyer 
Says Gunman in Fatal Meramec River Shooting Acted in Self-Defense, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH (May 14, 2014), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/lawyer-says-
gunman-in-fatal-meramec-river-shooting-acted-in/article_5d74d474-04fe-5cca-b6b1-cd04096715 
82.html; Jesse Bogan, Man Gets 25 Years in Shooting Death of Meramec River Floater, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (May 15, 2014), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/ 
man-gets-years-in-shooting-death-of-meramec-river-floater/article_4e9657d1-3691-529e-a05a-9 
8c3bee421c3.html. 
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drawl. Prosecutor William Seay, a former judge, speaks at the same modest 
rate but commands the bellowing voice of a fire and brimstone preacher. Seay 
is heavy, stern-faced, reclining comfortably in a leather chair bearing his name, 
and coolly rotating some manner of precious stone about his ring finger. 
Assistant prosecutor Michael Randazzo is seated to Seay’s left. He is the 
youngest of the players in the trial, and his facial features seem almost delicate 
next to the Churchill-esque Seay. Randazzo’s juvenile appearance is 
exaggerated by, despite his healthy frame, a slightly wide suit jacket. 
Crocker’s attorney, Michael Bert, arrives from Saint Louis shortly before 
Judge Parker’s final pretrial ruling. The unusually muggy morning has gotten a 
hold of him. His breathing is heavy, and his wavy hair looks slick with sweat. 
Perhaps exasperated by the heat, the I-44 traffic, or the unfavorable pretrial 
rulings, Bert quickly eclipses Seay and Judge Parker in words per minute. The 
one hundred and sixty potential jurors remain in limbo at the associate court 
across the street while Seay, Bert, and Judge Parker retire to (not-so-secret) 
chambers to clear up last minute concerns. 
By late morning, Judge Parker, now robed, stands stately in the middle of 
the courtroom to finally greet the potential jurors. The voir dire for the first one 
hundred potential jurors proceeds predictably: Seay never breaks character as 
the courtroom’s consummate pro, and Bert ingratiates himself to the jury’s 
rural sensibilities to quash the perception that he is the outsider. The 
homogeneity of the jury pool is also predictable, almost comically so. One 
potential juror appears to be Southeast Asian; the rest are white. Over half of 
the potential jurors own or have access to guns in their homes. Only ten 
potential jurors have never floated. Every potential juror has heard or read 
about the Paul Dart killing. The remainder of the first day of trial is spent 
empaneling the jury. The final jury composition is as follows: nine men, two 
women, all white, and all but one appear older than forty. 
The state opens its case on the second day of trial with testimony from 
members of Dart’s float party, fleshing out the story told in the charging 
documents.
126
 
On the third day of trial, the state presents the evidence relevant to the 
statute at the center of this Note. With Kim Cook, the Recorder of Deeds, on 
the stand, the court admits a warranty deed granting Crocker Lot Seven of 
Meramec Estates in the mid-2000s. The County Surveyor, Mark Mueller, 
testifies as to the location of physical evidence in relation to the property line 
of Lot Seven. Mueller testifies that the previous survey of Meramec Estates, 
completed by his father in 1970, marked the northwestern boundary of Lot 
Seven at north 33 degrees, 26 minutes, 11 seconds east. This was 
 
 126. Bogan, Lawyer Says Gunman in Fatal Meramec River Shooting Acted in Self-Defense, 
supra note 125. 
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approximately the eastern bank of the Meramec River’s “old channel” in 1970. 
The shell casings and blood pool lay fifty feet east from the 2013 water line but 
381 feet west from this 1970 boundary of Lot Seven. The court admits 
Mueller’s survey of the crime scene. The County Assessor, Kerry Summers, 
then testifies that the landowners across the river from Crocker are Philip and 
Helen Hughes and that their property reaches southwest to north 33 degrees, 26 
minutes, 11 seconds. The upshot of all this is that Crocker shot Paul Dart 
almost 400 feet from Crocker’s property, and the state appears to succeed in 
taking Missouri’s expanded castle doctrine out of play. 
Crocker takes the stand to maintain his belief that he owned property to the 
Meramec River. He has little support for this proposition, however, other than 
supposed representations made by Lot Seven’s previous owner and some 
vague, unsubstantiated statements of an easement. Crocker is wearing the same 
clothes he wore on the first day of trial, and he talks like he has a mouthful of 
rocks. By the time he reaches his version of the altercation that culminated in 
Dart’s death, he is down in the count. 
The reality is, however, that Crocker’s story is not implausible. According 
to Crocker, he approached a man urinating on what he thought to be his 
property. The man responded by exclaiming, “I’ll piss and shit anywhere I 
want!” Crocker retrieves a nine-millimeter handgun from his car and returns to 
order the floaters to “get on down the river.” He then hears someone joke, “I 
think he liked watching.” Insulted, Crocker fires shots into the gravel to 
intimidate the floaters. The floaters, who outnumber Crocker at least five to 
one, are not intimidated and instead arm themselves with softball-sized river 
rocks. Crocker is afraid that if he turns his back, a rock will find the back of his 
head. But, Crocker suffers his third strike when he claims that one rock did 
find his head, causing him to fire the fatal shot inadvertently. Two sheriff’s 
deputies later testify that Crocker sustained no injuries. 
Nevertheless, Crocker’s belief that he owned property to the river is 
genuine. The 1970 legal description of Meramec Estates establishes its 
northwestern boundary at the “southeast edge of the Meramec River,” but 
makes no mention of north 33 degrees, 26 minutes, 11 seconds. The Meramec 
River moved in the forty years since the creation of Meramec Estates, and the 
northwest property line of Lot Seven could certainly have moved with it: as 
any first-year Property student knows, land gained slowly by accretion goes to 
the riparian landowner.
127
 The State never produced evidence that the 
Meramec changed course suddenly by avulsion, and Crocker would have a 
strong argument that the land on which he shot Paul Dart was, in fact, his land. 
However, that argument never materializes. 
 
 127. Missouri follows this rule as well. 1 MO. PRAC., METHODS OF PRAC.: TRANSACT. GUIDE 
§ 15.4 (4th ed. 2011). 
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After both sides rest, Seay focuses his closing argument on keeping the 
castle doctrine out of the jury’s mindset. “This didn’t take place in his 
castle. . . . It was not about his right to protect property. He wasn’t protecting 
his home,” Seay’s voice booms. His line “[t]he defendant was on a mission” is 
soaked with contempt for vigilantism. Bert makes the best argument given the 
facts. “Jim stood his ground. He had no duty to retreat. Jim treated the property 
as his.” When Bert asks the jurors to consider whether the jury would want 
someone urinating in their yards, the hypothetical seems too far removed from 
the events of July 20, 2013. Seay has already driven home for the jury that 
Crocker shot Paul Dart farther than a football field away from his property. 
Randazzo echoes Seay in his rebuttal: “This isn’t about rights. . . . Property 
disputes shouldn’t be handled on riverbanks. They should be handled in the 
courtroom.”
128
 
With sheriff’s deputies occupying every standing space in the gallery, the 
jury finds Crocker guilty of second degree murder by 4:30 p.m. After a brief 
outburst of relief, Paul Dart’s family shares their emotions silently. 
In a way, the Crocker trial became another abortive attempt to answer the 
questions posed above, because the prosecution effectively shielded the jury 
from having to grapple with the expanded castle doctrine. This is another 
similarity between the Crocker case
129
 and its highly publicized Florida 
counterparts
130
—neither definitively addressed the controversial expanded 
self-defense laws swirling around the cases. The courtroom ignorance, willful 
or otherwise, of the statutes turns them into legal ciphers: the proponent of the 
expanded self-defense statute will argue that its rare application refutes the 
notion that it incentivizes, or at least eliminates deterrence for, the use of 
violence. The counterargument is that the self-defense statutes elicit acts of 
violence with mirages of legal immunity that offer unequal protections. 
Closing arguments on both sides in the Crocker case invoked the spirit of the 
castle doctrine while framing it as simple self-defense. The prosecution kept 
the expanded castle doctrine under wraps for obvious reasons, but the 
motivation for defense approach is harder to place. Did Bert want to invoke a 
justification with some familiarity for the rural jury? Was the protection 
offered by defense of premises too ludicrous for the jury? Was it futile to rebut 
 
 128. Randazzo then closes with a reference to the Lone Ranger that stays with the indictment 
of vigilantism, but is a bit too over the top for reproduction here. Man Gets 25 Years in Shooting 
Death of Meramec River Floater, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (May 15, 2014), http://www.stlto 
day.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/man-gets-years-in-shooting-death-of-meramec-river-floater 
/article_4e9657d1-3691-529e-a05a-98c3bee421c3.html. 
 129. The victim’s friends acknowledged the connection even though they slightly 
mischaracterized it. Id. (“There’s no stand-your-ground law in Missouri.”) 
 130. Alvarez, supra note 15; Alvarez & Buckley, supra note 15. 
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the state’s evidence that the shooting occurred 381 yards from Crocker’s 
property line? 
As noted above, with the revisions to section 563.031 aimed at 
undercutting Goodine,
131
 the legislature was essentially attempting to usurp the 
authority of the judiciary and its finders of fact. Seay and Randazzo were 
simply effective in keeping that authority with the jury in the Crocker case. 
Because the justification of self-defense exists “to compensate for the 
limitations of a written code,”
132
 we have historically depended on judges and 
juries to evaluate self-defense claims on a case-by-case basis. This makes 
perfect sense because no statutory construction can possibly contemplate every 
action that may fall under its purview.
133
 By tinkering with the doctrine of self-
defense, the legislature undercuts not only the holding of one case but, 
ultimately, the fundamental benefit of the doctrine itself.
134
 To put it bluntly, 
our identity crisis cannot be resolved on the floor of the Missouri House of 
Representatives,
135
 and it may never be resolved in Missouri’s circuit courts 
either. However, this should never preclude public dialogue on where to limit 
the justification of self-defense.
136
 
There are some aspects of the Dart killing that should be noted regardless 
of whether the expanded castle doctrine was applied. James Crocker’s 
interview with Detective Zachary Driskill concluded with the following 
exchange: 
James stated several times in the interview that he was going to protect his 
property and that, if he would have left, the people would have been gone 
before law enforcement arrival. I asked James even if the people had left 
wouldn’t that have been the desired result and he stated, “Yeah, that would 
have worked too.” I asked James again why he did not call law enforcement 
and he then stated he did not want to talk anymore.
137
 
Crocker was invoking that same rural notion of individualism that 
underlies the justification of self-defense, but, while Saint Louis may dwarf 
 
 131. Dierker, supra note 44. 
 132. Robinson, supra note 17. 
 133. Id. at 271. 
 134. Namely, that a jury of twelve of the defendant’s peers could review all of the facts of a 
case to determine whether a defendant’s conduct is acceptable. 
 135. Ideally, statutes passed by elected officials would express the will of the people, but, as 
noted earlier, that is rarely the reality. See Levinson, supra note 122 (describing the lack of 
representation of the people’s will in the U.S. House of Representatives). 
 136. See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural 
Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1324 (2003). 
 137. Felony Complaint and Request for Warrant, supra note 2. 
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Steelville,
138
 Crocker still had access to a telephone or assistance from his 
neighbors or a modern law enforcement agency. In fact, the first thing that 
Crocker did after shooting Dart was knock on his neighbor’s door to request 
that she call 911.
139
 
The not-so-rural reality of the scene in Crocker’s backyard reminds us that 
it is important not to conflate rural individualism with the American mythology 
of the Old West or “frontier culture,”
140
 distilled from a stew of comic books, 
TV shows, and Hollywood films that were never grounded in reality. What it 
means to be rural in the twenty-first century may actually have less to do with 
the stoic individualism of Gary Cooper in High Noon than the impassioned 
humanitarianism of Henry Fonda in The Grapes of Wrath.
141
 Billboards for 
tourist traps along I-44 love to boast that they were once the hideout of the 
James-Younger gang,
142
 but, nonetheless, Steelville did not exist in a vacuum 
of law and order on July 20, 2013. 
There is also a tendency to accept the longevity of the justification of self-
defense, with its masculine origins,
143
 as an expression of something hyper-
masculine and inherently violent in the American character.
144
 The sustained 
popularity of NFL football, despite its devastating impact on the players’ 
mental health, might attest to this aspect of our national character.
145
 But, we 
have to recognize the difference between our history and current and future 
 
 138. The population of the city of Saint Louis is approximately thirteen times that of 
Crawford County. See MO. CENSUS DATA CTR., http://census.missouri.edu/census2010/report. 
php?g=05000US29510|05000US29055 (last visited Feb. 16, 2014). 
 139. Sam Levin, James Crocker: Woman Who Called 911 After Float Trip Shooting Says He 
Was “Very Calm,” RIVERFRONT TIMES BLOGS (July 26, 2013, 10:06 AM), http://blogs.river 
fronttimes.com/dailyrft/2013/07/james_crocker_meramec_river_shooting_911.php. 
 140. Epps, supra note 18. 
 141. These two classics of American cinema encapsulate the individualism and solidarity at 
odds in modern formulations of self-defense law. Gary Cooper delivers lines like, “If you don’t 
know, there’s no use in me telling you,” while Henry Fonda delivers lines like, “Wherever there’s 
a fight, so hungry people can eat, I’ll be there.” High Noon (Republic Pictures 1952); Grapes of 
Wrath (20th Century Fox 1940). 
 142. Jesse’s Hideout, JESSE JAMES WAX MUSEUM, http://www.jessejameswaxmuseum.com/ 
cavern_hideout.php (last visited Jan. 31, 2015). 
 143. Alene Kristal, You’ve Come A Long Way, Baby: The Battered Women’s Syndrome 
Revisited, 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 111, 147 (1991). 
 144. Jamie R. Abrams, Examining Entrenched Masculinities in the Republican Government 
Tradition, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 165, 207 (2011) (discussing “[t]he historical fusion of citizenship, 
military service, and masculinity” in the American republican government tradition). 
 145. See League of Denial: The NFL’s Concussion Crisis, PBS.ORG (Oct. 8, 2013), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/league-of-denial/ (providing further discussion of NFL 
football’s impact on the players). 
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identity.
146
 The characterization of rural individualism as a relic of our nation’s 
past would also explain the state of perpetual fear that proponents of expanded 
self-defense seem to foster.
147
 When these individualists are given the sense 
that they are part of an old order nearing extinction, it makes them defensive 
about any newness or otherness that they might encounter. This aversion to 
otherness is probably why the racially charged self-defense stories of 2013 and 
2014 had such a visceral impact on Americans. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
After reviewing the general history of the justification of self-defense, it is 
apparent that Missouri’s current law on the “use of force in defense of 
persons”
148
 fits within both the national debate currently raging on Stand Your 
Ground laws and a broader historical narrative of the American erosion of the 
duty to retreat.
149
 The discrimination fostered by reformulations of established 
self-defense doctrines, the shoddy statutory construction of those 
reformulations,
150
 and unresolved historical conflicts embedded in the 
justification of self-defense itself
151
 are all reasons to critically reexamine the 
2007 and 2010 amendments to 563.031 and 563.011. 
As of now, the terrifying events of July 20, 2013, are fortunately not 
typical. However, the fear remains that we may allow antiquated 
conceptualizations of justifiable homicide to define us as a nation of petty, 
isolated vigilante pretenders living in a state of perpetual mistrust. If that 
happens, Meramec River killings will become all too typical. 
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